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DENSITY-1-BOUNDING AND QUASIMINIMALITY IN
THE GENERIC DEGREES
PETER CHOLAK, GREGORY IGUSA
Abstract. We consider the question “Is every nonzero generic
degree a density-1-bounding generic degree?” By previous results
[8] either resolution of this question would answer an open ques-
tion concerning the structure of the generic degrees: A positive
result would prove that there are no minimal generic degrees, and
a negative result would prove that there exist minimal pairs in the
generic degrees.
We consider several techniques for showing that the answer
might be positive, and use those techniques to prove that a wide
class of assumptions is sufficient to prove density-1-bounding.
We also consider a historic difficulty in constructing a potential
counterexample: By previous results [7] any generic degree that is
not density-1-bounding must be quasiminimal, so in particular, any
construction of a non-density-1-bounding generic degree must use
a method that is able to construct a quasiminimal generic degree.
However, all previously known examples of quasiminimal sets are
also density-1, and so trivially density-1-bounding. We provide
several examples of non-density-1 sets that are quasiminimal.
Using cofinite and mod-finite reducibility, we extend our results
to the uniform coarse degrees, and to the nonuniform generic de-
grees. We define all of the above terms, and we provide indepen-
dent motivation for the study of each of them.
Combined with a concurrently written paper of Hirschfeldt,
Jockusch, Kuyper, and Schupp [4], this paper provides a charac-
terization of the level of randomness required to ensure quasimini-
mality in the uniform and nonuniform coarse and generic degrees.
1. Introduction
Generic computability was introduced by Kapovich, Miasnikov, Schupp
and Shpilrain [10] as a computability-theoretic analogue of the real-
world phenomenon in which a problem is apparently much easier to
solve than would be suggested by complexity theory. The idea of
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generic-case complexity is to measure the complexity of the major-
ity of instances of a problem, while disregarding “difficult” instances
if they are sufficiently uncommon. Generic computability as well as
coarse computability, a similarly defined notion, were later studied by
Jockusch and Schupp [9] in the framework of the theory of computabil-
ity theory.
In generic and coarse computability, we think of a real A that we are
trying to compute as the problem, and the bits of A as the instances of
the problem. The goal, then, is to compute the majority of the bits of
A. In generic computability, we are not allowed to make any mistakes,
but we are allowed to not always give answers. In coarse computability,
we must give answers everywhere, but we are allowed to make some
mistakes. Coarse computability can be thought of as the analogue
of algorithms that take shortcuts, sacrificing accuracy for speed, while
generic computability is the analogue of completely accurate algorithms
that run very quickly in most cases, but more slowly or perhaps not at
all in others. Following the notation of Jockusch and Schupp [9], we
make this precise as follows.
Definition 1.1. Let A ⊆ ω. Then A is density-1 if the limit of the
densities of its initial segments is 1, or in other words, if limn→∞
|A∩n|
n
=
1.
In this paper a real A is thought of either as a subset of ω, or as a
function A : ω → {0, 1}. In situations where it will not cause confusion,
the two notations will be used interchangably, so n ∈ Ameans the same
thing as A(n) = 1, and n /∈ A means the same thing as A(n) = 0.
Definition 1.2. A partial computation of a real A is a partial com-
putation φ (potentially with an oracle) such that for any n, if φ(n) ↓,
then φ(n) = A(n).
Definition 1.3. A real A is generically computable if there exists a
partial computable function φ such that dom(φ) is density-1, and φ is
a partial computation of A.
Definition 1.4. A real A is coarsely computable if there exists a total
computable function φ, whose range is contained in {0, 1} such that
{n | φ(n) = A(n)} is density-1.
In order to obtain degree structures for these, we need to make sure
that our notion of relative computability is transitive, or in other words,
that if X ≤ Y ≤ Z, then X ≤ Z. The outputs of our “computations”
are generic and coarse descriptions of our reals, and so the inputs of
our computations should also be generic and coarse descriptions. This
is fairly straightforward to define for coarse reducibility.
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Definition 1.5. Let A and B be reals. Then B is (uniformly) coarsely
reducible to A if there exists a Turing functional φ such that for any C
for which {n : A(n) = C(n)} is density-1, φC is a coarse computation
of B. In this case, we write B ≤c A.
In nonuniform coarse reducibility, the functional φ is allowed to de-
pend on C. There is no major reason to prefer the uniform or nonuni-
form reducibilities, although it appears that for coarse reducibility, the
nonuniform version is slightly easier to work with, while for generic
reducibility, the uniform version is slightly easier to work with. This
paper is primarily focused on generic reducibility, but will occasionally
derive conclusions about (uniform) coarse reducibility from arguments
concerning (uniform) generic reducibility, and so in this paper, unless
specifically specified otherwise, all reducibilities are assumed to be uni-
form.
Generic reducibility is somewhat more difficult to define than coarse
reducibility, because to define generic reducibility, we are forced to
discuss what it means to use a partial computation as an oracle in a
computation. Our generic computations are not even required to tell
us whether or not they will give an output on a given value, and so
our generic computations must be able to work with oracles that also
do not tell them which outputs they will give. For this reason, we first
define partial oracles, and discuss what it means for a Turing functional
to work with a partial oracle.
2. Partial Oracles
We wish to define computations with partial oracles so that the fol-
lowing happens: We must be able to ask questions of our oracles and
make decisions based on the outputs. Second, we must be able to avoid
being paralyzed when an oracle does not give outputs, and we must
also not be able to know whether or not the oracle will give an output
in the future, if it has not yet given an output. We may formalize
this either with time delays built in to our oracles, or with enumera-
tion operators, which are designed to be blind to exactly the sorts of
information that we do not wish to be able to use.
For uniform reducibilities, these are equivalent in terms of what is
reducible to what, although not necessarily in terms of the actual pro-
cedures [7]. For nonuniform reducibilities, it is not known whether or
not the two ways to approach partial oracles are equivalent. In this
paper, we present the reducibility in terms of time-dependent oracles.
Definition 2.1. Let A be a real. Then a (time-dependent) partial
oracle, (A), for A is a set of ordered triples 〈n, x, l〉 such that:
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n ∈ ω, x ∈ 2, l ∈ ω,
∃l
(
〈n, 0, l〉 ∈ (A)
)
=⇒ n /∈ A,
∃l
(
〈n, 1, l〉 ∈ (A)
)
=⇒ n ∈ A,
For every n, x, there exists at most one l such that 〈n, x, l〉 ∈ (A).
When using such an oracle, querying whether or not n ∈ A consists
of initiating a search for some value of l such that either 〈n, 0, l〉 ∈ (A),
or 〈n, 1, l〉 ∈ (A). If there exists such an l, we say that (A)(n) converges,
or that (A)(n) ↓. The domain of (A), written dom((A)), is the set of n
for which there exists such an l. If 〈n, x, l〉 ∈ (A), then we write that
(A)(n) = x. Other computations, processes, and queries may be carried
out while searching for such an l. When working with reducibilities that
use partial oracles, we will frequently abuse notation and refer to A as
the partial oracle for A that converges immediately on all inputs.
In previous work [3, 7, 8], the second author omitted the uniqueness
requirement on l. Including this convention does not change any re-
ducibilities that we will define, and it will be convenient to us in Section
6, as it will ensure that for any n, (A) ↾ n must always be computable.
Definition 2.2. Let A be a real. Then a generic oracle, (A), for A is
a partial oracle for A such that dom((A)) is density-1.
Note that a generic computation of A is the same thing as a compu-
tation of a generic oracle for A.
Definition 2.3. Let A and B be reals. Then B is (uniformly) gener-
ically reducible to A if there exists a Turing functional φ such that for
every generic oracle, (A), for A, φ(A) is a generic computation of B. In
this case, we write B ≤g A.
When working with partial oracles in a context where (1) mistakes
are not allowed to be made, and (2) one must act uniformly, it can
be shown that no advantage can be gained by actively using the time
dependence of the partial oracles (see Observation 2.8). It is frequently
much more convenient to work only with Turing functionals which ig-
nore the time dependence of their partial oracles, and in this paper, we
will later be assuming that all Turing functionals are of that form.
Those familiar with enumeration reduction will see that what we
define below is an enumeration operator on the graph of the partial
function given by a partial oracle.
Definition 2.4. Let φ be a Turing functional. Then the time-independent
version of φ is the (potentially multi-valued) functional ψ such that if
X is any partial oracle, then ψX(n) is defined by considering all partial
oracles Y whose domains are finite subsets of dom(X), and which agree
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with X on their domains, and giving every output that φY (n) would
give on any of those partial oracles Y .
We refer to a ψ defined in this way as a time-independent Turing
functional.
Note that this process can be carried out effectively. There are count-
ably many finite partial oracles agreeing with X , and they can be enu-
merated effectively in X . The computations of φY (n) can be carried
out in parallel. Thus if ψ is a time-independent Turing functional, then
for a partial oracle X , the outputs of ψX are Σ0,X1 in much the same
way that the outputs of φX are Σ0,X1 for an ordinary Turing functional
φ and oracle and X .
In the remark after Theorem 3.6 we will see why multi-valued func-
tionals are necessary for our purposes.
We now prove some basic facts concerning partial oracles and time-
independent functionals. Our first observation is a justification of why
these are referred to as time-independent.
Observation 2.5. Assume φ is a time-independent functional. Let X
and Y be partial oracles that have the same domains and agree on their
domains. (So they agree as partial functions, although perhaps with
different l values at the locations where they converge.) Then φX = φY
as a (potentially partial, potentially mutli-valued) function.
Note that this justifies the abuse of notation in which A is the partial
oracle that halts everywhere. Every oracle for A that halts everywhere
gives the same outputs when given to a time-independent functional,
and so it does not matter which specific one we use.
Proof. The definition of a time-independent functional specifically en-
sures that φX depends only on X as a partial function. 
This next observation is the primary reason that we will use time-
independent functionals. One important use of the following observa-
tion is that if we are checking whether A ≤g B via φ, if we check that
φB never makes any mistakes about A, then it also ensures that for ev-
ery partial oracle (B) for B, φ(B) also never makes any mistakes about
A.
Observation 2.6. Assume φ is a time-independent functional. Let X
and Y be partial oracles such that dom(Y ) ⊆ dom(X), and such that
Y agrees with X on its domain. Then if φY (n) = x, then φX(n) = x.
Note that time-independent functionals are sometimes multivalued,
and so it is possible that φX(n) has more than one value and that φY
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does not. This observation simply notes that a “larger” oracle must
cause the functional to give more outputs.
Proof. Assume that φ is the time-independent version of θ. Assume
that φY (n) = x. This is because, at some finite stage, we see a finite
partial oracle Z agreeing with Y on its domain, such that θZ(n) = x.
We have that dom(Y ) ⊆ dom(X), and that Y agrees with X on its
domain. Therefore, at some stage, we will see that Z is a partial oracle
that agrees with X on its domain, and at that stage, we will begin
computing θZ(n). 
The following two observations will justify us in only using time-
independent functionals, so that the aforementioned conveniences will
be available to us.
Observation 2.7. Let A and B be reals. Assume that B ≤g A via φ.
Then for any n, x, and for any partial oracle (A) for A, if φ(A)(n) = x,
then B(n) = x.
In particular, given any X and Y , if φY is multi-valued, then it
cannot be the case that X ≤g Y via φ.
Remark. The second part of the observation is particularly useful in
that it allows us to make conclusions about whether or not X ≤g Y
via φ without knowing X . This is similar to the fact that in ordinary
Turing computation, if φY is not total, then (without knowing X , one
knows that) it is not the case that X ≤T Y via φ. It is also similar
to the fact that if one sees that for every Z, there is some n such that
φZ(n) 6= X(n), then (without knowing Y , one knows that) it is not the
case that X ≤T Y via φ. These sorts of observations are helpful in, for
example, the classical construction of a real of minimal Turing degree.
Proof. By definition of generic reduction, we have that, for any generic
oracle (A) for A, if φ(A)(n) = x, then B(n) = x. Furthermore, given any
partial oracle (A) for A, any initial segment of (A) can be extended
to a generic oracle for A by adding more outputs at values not yet
queried (or with l values larger than have yet been checked). That
generic oracle would not be able to have given any incorrect outputs
about B, and so there can be no finite stage at which φ(A) gives any
incorrect outputs about B.
It cannot be the case that X(n) has more than one value, and so if
φ(Y )(n) has more than one value, then the conclusion of the first part
of the observation does not hold. 
Observation 2.8. Let A and B be reals. Assume that B ≤g A via φ.
Then B ≤g A via the time-independent version of φ.
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Proof. Assume that B ≤g A via φ. Let ψ be the time-independent
version of φ. Let (A) be any generic oracle for A. If φ(A)(n) ↓, then
it halts having queried only finitely much of (A). Let Y be the finite
partial oracle that agrees with that portion of (A), and that does not
halt anywhere else. Then φY (n) ↓, and so as a result, we have that
ψ(A)(n) ↓. Thus dom(φ(A)) ⊆ dom(ψ(A)) and because dom(φ(A)) is
density-1, we also have that dom(ψ(A)) is density-1.
Furthermore, every partial oracle that agrees with (A) is a partial
oracle for A, so by Observation 2.7, we have that if ψ(A)(n) = x, then
B(n) = x. Therefore ψ(A) never gives any incorrect outputs about B,
and so ψ(A) is a generic computation of B. 
3. Relationships Between Degree Structures
The Turing degrees embed both into the coarse and into the generic
degrees [3, 4, 9]. These embeddings factor through the mod-finite and
cofinite degrees, respectively [3]. These additional degree structures
will be useful in terms of analyzing the embedded Turing degrees, as
there are a number of lemmas making them convenient and relevant.
Definition 3.1. Let A and B be reals. Then B is mod-finitely reducible
to A if there exists a Turing functional φ such that for any C ≡ A (mod
finite), φC is total, and computes a set that is ≡ B (mod finite). In
this case, we write B ≤mf A.
Definition 3.2. Let A be a real. Then a cofinite oracle, (A), for A is
a partial oracle for A such that dom((A)) is cofinite.
Definition 3.3. Let A and B be reals. Then B is cofinitely reducible
to A if there exists a Turing functional φ such that for every cofinite
oracle, (A), for A, φ(A) is a partial computation of B with cofinite
domain. In this case, we write B ≤cf A.
Note that all the results from the previous section concerning time-
independent functionals in generic reduction apply equally well when
working with cofinite reduction.
Note also that cofinitely or mod-finitely computing a real is tradi-
tionally equivalent to computing the real, since the finite error can be
directly coded into the machine. The difference here comes from the de-
mand that the reduction is uniform, a single reduction that works over
all potential oracles. The implications between these two reducibilities
and Turing reducibility are as follows.
Theorem 3.4 (Dzhafarov, Igusa). B ≤mf A ⇒ B ≤cf A ⇒ B ≤T A,
and all of the implications are strict.
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The embeddings between the Turing, generic, coarse, cofinite, and
mod-finite degrees can be induced by the following maps on reals.
Definition 3.5. If X ⊆ ω, then R(X) = {(2m+1)2n : m ∈ ω, n ∈ X}.
If X ⊆ ω, then R˜(X) = {m : (∃n ∈ X)(2n ≤ m < 2n+1)}.
The idea behind R is that each bit of X is coded redundantly over
infinitely many bits of R(X) (in fact, positive density many bits). On
the other hand, for R˜, each bit of X is coded into progressively larger
and larger (finite) initial segments of R˜(X). These maps induce em-
beddings as follows.
Theorem 3.6 (Dzhafarov, Igusa [3]). The map X 7→ R(X) induces an
embedding of the Turing degrees into either the mod-finite or cofinite
degrees.
The map X 7→ R˜(X) induces an embedding of the mod-finite degrees
into the coarse degrees or of the cofinite degrees into the generic degrees.
Symbolically, we have that for any reals A and B:
(B ≤T A)⇔ (R(B) ≤mf R(A))⇔ (R(B) ≤cf R(A)).
(B ≤mf A)⇔ (R˜(B) ≤c R˜(A))
(B ≤cf A)⇔ (R˜(B) ≤g R˜(A))
We describe the idea behind the embedding of the cofinite degrees
into the generic degrees. The embeddings of the mod-finite degrees into
the coarse degrees and of the Turing degrees into the cofinite degrees
are similar, although the embedding of the Turing degrees into the
mod-finite degrees is somewhat more subtle. See Prop 3.3 and Lemma
3.4 from [3] for a more thorough explanation.
In essence, a generic oracle for R˜(X) has precisely the same infor-
mation in it as a cofinite oracle for X . This is because for cofinitely
many n, there must be some m between 2n and 2n+1 in the domain of
a generic oracle, or else its domain cannot be density-1. Conversely, a
cofinite oracle for X can compute a cofinite (and hence generic) oracle
for R˜(X). The embedding of the mod-finite degrees into the coarse
degrees is by a voting algorithm that must eventually give correct an-
swers, and the embedding of the Turing degrees into the cofinite degrees
is by an unbounded search that must eventually halt for every n.
Remark. The algorithm described above illustrates the reason that
time-independent functionals are by their nature potentially multival-
ued. If we were to use the functional described above for computing
X from a generic oracle for R˜(X), but if we were to give, as input, a
real Y that was not in the range of R˜, then there would be intervals
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[2n, 2n + 1) on which the oracle gave more than one different output,
and so our algorithm would also give more than one different output
on those values of n.
If we did not demand that our algorithms were time-independent,
then we could give the first output that we saw from our oracle, but
then our output would depend on the order in which our oracle gave
its outputs.
Using Theorem 3.6, we may embed the Turing degrees into any of
the other four degree structures discussed in this section. In any of
these degree structures, we define a real to be “quasiminimal” if it is
nonzero, but is not an upper bound for any embedded Turing degrees.
Definition 3.7. Let A be a real, and let ≤ be any of: ≤c,≤g,≤mf ,≤cf .
Then A is quasiminimal in the ≤ degrees if A  0, and if, for every
B, if B T 0, then,
• (if ≤ is either ≤c or ≤g) R˜(R(B))  A.
• (if ≤ is either ≤mf or ≤cf) R(B)  A.
In these degree structures, a degree is quasiminimal if any (equivalently
all) of its elements are quasiminimal.
In the next section, we will see additional motivation as to what
makes quasiminimality interesting, but the basic idea is that a quasi-
minimal degree is a degree that, on one hand is not computable, but
on the other hand, does not contain any actual information, in that
there are no noncomputable reals that it can compute.
The implication in Theorem 3.4 allows quasiminimality to propagate
in a surprisingly robust manner.
Proposition 3.8. Assume A is quasiminimal in the cofinite degrees.
Then A is quasiminimal in the mod-finite, generic, and coarse degrees.
Proof. Let A be quasiminimal in the cofinite degrees, and let B be
noncomputable in the Turing degrees.
By definition of quasiminimality, R(B) cf A. By Theorem 3.4, we
therefore have that R(B) mf A. Thus for any noncomputable B, we
have that R(B) mf A, and so A is quasiminimal in the mod-finite
degrees.
Using Theorem 3.6 and the above two statements, we have that
R˜(R(B))  R˜(A) in either the generic or coarse degrees, so it remains
to show that A ≤ R˜(A) in both the coarse and generic degrees, because
then the fact that R˜(R(B))  R˜(A) will also show that R˜(R(B))  A.
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This last fact follows from the idea behind the proof of Theorem
3.6, mentioned in this paper under the statement of the theorem. A
generic oracle for R˜(A) contains enough information to cofinitely (and
hence generically) compute A in a uniform manner. Likewise a coarse
oracle for R˜(A) contains enough information to mod-finitely (and hence
coarsely) compute A, again uniformly. 
4. Quasiminimality and Density-1 Bounding
The results in this paper are motivated in large part by the following
question, posed by the second author as Question 3 in [8].
Question 1. Is it true that for every nonzero generic degree a there
exists a nonzero generic degree b such that b ≤g a and such that b is
the generic degree of a density-1 real?
The resolution of this question would provide insight into the struc-
ture of the generic degrees: If the answer is “yes,” then there are no
minimal generic degrees, and if the answer is “no,” then there are mini-
mal pairs in the generic degrees [8]. Also, the question can be rephrased
as a question about the relationship between generic computability and
coarse computability: We see below that a generic degree is the degree
of a density-1 real if and only if it is the generic degree of a coarsely
computable real, so the question is about how ubiquitous the coarsely
computable reals are at the bottom of the generic degrees.
Observation 4.1. Let B be a real, then B is coarsely computable if
and only if the generic degree of B has a density-1 set.
Proof. If B is density-1, then B is coarsely computable because it agrees
with N on a set of density 1.
Conversely, if B is coarsely computable, then fix a computable X
such that B agrees with X on a set of density 1. Let Y = {n :
X(n) = B(n)}. Then Y ≤g B because X is computable, and any
generic oracle for B can enumerate a density-1 set of locations where
it agrees with X . Likewise, B ≤g Y because again, X is computable,
and any generic oracle for Y can enumerate a density-1 set of locations
where X is correct about B, and then output the values of X on those
locations. 
To help us study Question 1, we introduce the following terminology.
Definition 4.2. A generic degree a is density-1-bounding if there is
a nonzero generic degree b such that b ≤g a and such that b is the
generic degree of a density-1 real.
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A real A is density-1-bounding if it is of density-1-bounding generic
degree.
In prior work, the second author showed that every noncomputable
real can generically compute a density-1 real that is not generically
computable [7]. In our context, this can be rephrased as saying that
every nonzero embedded Turing degree is density-1-bounding in the
generic degrees. In particular, this implies the following.
Proposition 4.3. [7] If b is not quasiminimal, then b is density-1-
bounding.
We will reprove this proposition in this paper, as the proof can be
modified to prove slightly more. One of the important consequences of
this proposition, however, is that any attempt to construct a b that is
not density-1-bounding must be a construction that is capable of pro-
ducing a quasiminimal a. Unfortunately, currently, every example of a
construction of a quasiminimal real A constructs A to be both quasi-
minimal, and also density-1, and therefore trivially density-1-bounding.
To help us understand quasiminimality, and therefore what sorts of
constructions might potentially be able to produce sets that are not
density-1 bounding, we provide several examples of quasiminimal sets
that are not density-1. We also prove that all of the sets we construct
are density-1-bounding, and prove that a few additional sorts of sets are
density-1-bounding. This can be taken as evidence toward the answer
to Question 1 being “yes.”
In the remainder of this section, we prove Proposition 4.3, and we
modify the proof to show that if a is an embedded cofinite degree,
then it is density-1-bounding, and also to show a rather curious result
linking non-density-1-bounding with all Π01-basis theorems. In the next
section, we show that 1-generics and 1-randoms are both quasiminimal
in the generic degrees, and also that they are density-1-bounding.
For the constructions in the rest of this section, we will use the
following notation.
Definition 4.4. Let Pi = [2
i, 2i+1). Let X ⊆ ω.
If e ≤ i, say that X has a gap of size 2−e at Pi if |X ∩Pi| ≤ 2
i−2i−e.
The following lemma illustrates the control that these Pi give over a
construction that uses them.
Lemma 4.5. Let X ⊆ ω.
Then X is density-1 if and only if for every e, there are at most
finitely many i ≥ e such that X has a gap of size 2−e at Pi.
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This is a slight strengthening of Lemma 2.3 from [7], which required
that the gaps be at the ends of the Pi. We will require this lemma in
the generality just stated later in this section.
Proof. If X has a gap of size 2−e at Pi then, because each Pi contains
half the elements of ω up to the end of Pi,
|X↾2i+1|
2i+1
≤ 1−2−e−1. If, for a
single value of e, this happens infinitely often, then X is not density-1.
Conversely, assume that for every e, there are finitely many i such
that X has a gap of size 2−e at Pi. Let ǫ > 0. We must show that
there is an m such that ∀n ≥ m
(
|X↾n|
n
> 1− ǫ
)
. Choose e ∈ ω such
that (1−3 ·2−e) > 1− ǫ. Fix j such that for ∀i > j, X does not have a
gap of size 2−e at Pi. Let m = 2
j+e+1. Then we claim that for n ≥ m,
|X↾n|
n
> 1− ǫ.
The reason for this is that for n ≥ m, the smallest value that |X↾n|
n
could possibly take is at the beginning of some Pk, after omitting the
largest number of elements that can be omitted from Pk without caus-
ing X to have a gap of size 2−e at Pk. If this happens, then the elements
missing from X ↾ n can, at most, consist of: these elements from the
beginning of Pk, all of the elements less than 2
j+1, and the elements
missing from the Pi for j < i < k. The first elements are at most n2
−e
many elements because the number of elements of Pk is at most n. The
second elements are at most n2−e many elements because they are at
most 2j+1 many elements, and n ≥ 2j+e+1. The last elements are at
most n2−e many elements because, for each i between j and k, X does
not have a gap of size 2−e at Pi.
Thus, there are at most 3n2−e elements missing from X ↾ n, and so
|X↾n|
n
> (1− 3 · 2−e) > 1− ǫ. 
Proof (Proposition 4.3). We define a pair of functionals, φ, ψ such that
for any real X , if X is not left c.e. (not the leftmost path of any
computable tree) then φX is an enumeration of a density-1 set with no
density-1 c.e. subset, and if X is not right c.e. (not the rightmost path
of any computable tree) then ψX is an enumeration of a density-1 set
with no density-1 c.e. subset. This will suffice to prove Proposition 4.3
as follows.
Let a be a generic degree that is not quasiminimal, and let A have
generic degree a. By definition of quasiminimality, fix X0 noncom-
putable such that R˜(R(X0)) ≤g A. Because X0 is noncomputable, X0
must be either not left c.e. or not right c.e.. By symmetry, assume X0 is
not left c.e.. Let B the set enumerated by φX0 , and let b be the generic
degree of B. By construction of φ, B is density-1. Furthermore b ≤g a
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because any generic oracle for A can generically compute R˜(R(X0)),
and this generic computation can uniformly be used to compute X0,
and hence to enumerate B. This enumeration is a generic computation
of B because it halts on density-1, and it is correct about B wherever
it halts. Finally, B is not generically computable because it has no
density-1 c.e. subset, and if there were a generic computation of B,
then the set of n where that computation halted and outputted a 1
would be a density-1 c.e. set. (Density-1 because it is the intersection
of two density-1 sets, c.e. because halting and outputting a 1 is a Σ1
condition.)
We construct φ as follows. ψ will be constructed symmetrically. For
each e, we will have an eth strategy, which will act to ensure that if
the eth c.e. set We has density 1, then We is not a subset of φ
X for
any X ∈ 2ω. In doing so, there will be at most one X = Xe ∈ 2
ω such
that the strategy prevents φXe from enumerating a density-1 set, and
that Xe will be left c.e.. Lemma 4.5 will then be used to ensure that
the only reals X such that φX is not density-1 are the Xe from these
strategies.
We define φ using the subintervals Pi from Definition 4.4. At stage s,
we simultaneously define φX on Ps for every X ∈ 2
ω. Note that because
φX enumerates its elements in increasing order, the set enumerated
by φX is actually uniformly computable from X , not just uniformly
generically computable from X , although this is not relevant for our
purposes.
At stage s, for each e < s, the eth strategy acts as follows. Consider
the tree Te,s whose paths are the reals X such that the numbers less
than 2s enumerated by φX are a superset of the numbers less than 2e
enumerated by We by stage s. The reals X not on Te,s are the reals
that have already “beaten” We, in that We has enumerated an element
that they will never enumerate, and so the eth strategy will never need
to work with those X again. If Te,s has no paths, then the eth strategy
has accomplished its task, and so it does nothing.
If Te,s has a path, then the eth strategy places a “marker” pe,s on
the shortest unmarked node of the leftmost path of Te,s. Here, an
unmarked node is a node such that the eth strategy has not yet placed
a marker on that node, regardless of whether or not other strategies
have marked that node. When it places the marker pe,s on the node σ,
it declares that for every X ≻ σ, φX must have a gap of size 2−e at Ps.
Specifically, the strategy requires that the last 2s−e elements of Ps are
not in φX . The strategy makes no other requirements for φX if X ⊁ σ.
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To define φX ↾ Ps for any given X , we simply enumerate every
element of Ps that no strategy requires us to not enumerate.
We now prove that this construction has the desired properties.
First we show that for every e, and for every X ∈ 2ω, We is not a
density-1 subset of φX . Let e be given. Either there is some s such
that Te,s has no paths, or for every s, Te,s has at least one path.
In the first case we have that for every X , We has enumerated a
number not enumerated by φX , and so for every X ,We cannot possibly
be a density-1 subset of the set enumerated by φX .
In the second case, let Te =
⋂
s Te,s, and let Xe be the leftmost path
of Te. Note that for every σ ≺ Xe, there is some s such that σ has the
marker pe,s. This is because every τ to the left of that σ eventually is
removed from some Te,s, and once all of those τ are removed, after at
most |σ| many more steps, σ must have a marker placed on it by the
eth strategy.
All of these σ are in Te, and so, in particular, there are infinitely many
nodes in Te with markers placed by the eth strategy. Therefore there
are infinitely many s for which We has a gap of size 2
−e at Ps, because
if We ever enumerates an element from the last 2
s−e many elements of
Ps, then at that stage s
′, every X extending the node marked with pe,s
will be removed from Te,s′. Thus, each marker on a σ ∈ T corresponds
to a gap of size 2−e in We. Therefore We is not an enumeration of
a density-1 set, and in particular, not an enumeration of a density-1
subset of the set enumerated by φX for any X .
Next we show that if X is not left c.e., then φX is an enumeration
of a density-1 set.
Each Xe, if it is defined, is left c.e. because it is the leftmost path
of a Π01 tree, and because for every Π
0
1 tree, there is a computable tree
having the same infinite paths. It remains to show that if X is not
equal to any of the Xe, then φ
X enumerates a density-1 set. To show
this, we show that for every e, if Xe is not defined, or if X is not equal
to Xe, then only finitely many markers are placed on initial segments
of X by strategy e. This will show that for every e, φX has finitely
many gaps of size 2−e, and so by Lemma 4.5, φX is density-1.
So, fix e, assume Xe is defined, and assume X 6= Xe. If X is to
the left of Xe, then at some stage s, X was removed from Te,s, and
after that stage, X stopped receiving new markers from strategy e. No
marker ever gets placed to the right of Xe by strategy e, so if X is to
the right of Xe, then the only markers from strategy e on X are those
placed on σ that are initial segments of both X and Xe, of which there
are at most finitely many. If Xe is not defined, it is because there is
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some stage at which strategy e stops acting, and so strategy e uses
at most finitely many markers, so in particular, each X can receive at
most finitely many markers from strategy e.
Thus, if X is not equal to any of the Xe, then for every e only finitely
many markers are placed on initial segments of X by strategy e, so φX
is density-1.
To construct ψ, we do the same construction but using rightmost
paths instead of leftmost paths. 
We now modify the proof to prove a stronger result.
Proposition 4.6. Assume A is noncomputable. Then R˜(A) is density-
1-bounding in the generic degrees.
Proposition 4.3 says that embedded noncomputable Turing degrees
are density-1-bounding, while Proposition 4.6 says that embedded non-
computable cofinite degrees are density-1-bounding. In the next sec-
tion, we will demonstrate examples of quasiminimal cofinite degrees,
which, in particular, embed into the generic degrees as quasiminimal,
and hence this proposition is strictly stronger than Proposition 4.3.
Proof. Assume A is noncomputable, and further assume that A is not
left c.e.. Let φ be the functional φ from the proof of Proposition 4.3.
Let φ˜ be the time-independent functional defined from φ as follows.
Given a partial oracle (X), φ˜(X)(n) ↓= 1 if and only if for every Y
such that (X) is a partial oracle for Y , φY (n) ↓= 1.
(Note that this definition is very similar to the definition of ψ as
in Definition 2.4. The primary difference is that in this case, φ was
created as a functional that uses ordinary Turing oracles, whereas in
Definition 2.4, φ is a functional that uses partial oracles.)
By compactness, this is a Σ1 operation: if every Y agreeing with
(X) enumerates some n, then there is a finite stage at which we see
this happen. Note also that the quantifier over Y agreeing with (X)
does not interfere with the fact that (X) enumerates its domain: As
(X) produces more answers, the set of Y agreeing with (X) becomes
smaller, and so the set of n for which φ˜(X)(n) ↓ becomes larger, so we
never need to “take back” any n for which φ˜(X)(n) has halted.
We now claim that if (A) is a cofinite oracle for A (recall that any
generic oracle for R˜(A) can uniformly produce a cofinite oracle for A),
then φ˜(A) is a generic computation of the set enumerated by φA, which
we have proved is density-1 and not generically computable. Because
A is one of the Y ’s agreeing with (A), we have that the domain of
φ˜(A) is a subset of the domain of φA, so in particular, φ˜(A) never makes
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any mistakes about the set it is computing. It remains to show that
dom(φ˜(A)) is density-1.
To prove this, let S be the set of initial segments of Y ’s such that
(A) is a partial oracle for Y . We show that strategy e from the proof
of Proposition 4.3 places at most finitely many markers on elements
of S. To show this, define Te as in the proof of Proposition 4.3. If
Te is finite, then strategy e places at most finitely many markers, and
so it places at most finitely many markers on elements of S. If Te is
infinite, then let Xe be the leftmost path of Te, and we claim that for
every σ ≺ Xe, strategy e places at most finitely many markers on τ
that are not extensions of σ. This is because everything to the left of
σ eventually gets removed from Te, and everything to the right of σ
never gets a marker, and there are only finitely many things below σ.
So it remains to show that there is some σ ≺ Xe such that σ has no
extensions in S. This follows from the fact that A is not left c.e., (A)
is a cofinite oracle for A, and every Y agreeing with (A) is mod-finitely
equal to A, and so also not left c.e.. Therefore there must be some n
such that (A)(n) ↓6= Xe(n), because Xe is left c.e., and so (A) is not a
partial oracle for Xe.
We therefore conclude that for every e, S has only finitely many
markers on it placed by strategy e, and thus that the domain of φ˜(A)
has at most finitely many gaps of size 2−e, because if the eth strategy
places a marker pe,s on some σ /∈ S, then for every Y agreeing with (A),
σ ⊀ Y , and so φY does not have a gap of size 2−e at Ps. (Or rather,
the eth strategy does not cause it to have such a gap. The gaps of size
2−e can be created by strategy e′ for any e′ < e, but this proof shows
that each one of those strategies causes at most finitely many gaps to
appear in the domain of φ˜(A).) Thus, by Lemma 4.5, the domain of
φ˜(A) is density-1. 
As a corollary to the proof of Proposition 4.6, we make an observation
that will have a number of consequences.
Observation 4.7. Assume there is no left c.e. set X such that {n :
X(n) = A(n)} is density-1. Then A is density-1-bounding.
Proof. Define φ˜ as above. If A is a real, there is no left c.e. set X such
that {n : X(n) = A(n)} is density-1, and (A) is a generic oracle for
A, then, in particular, for every e, Xe is not one of the reals Y that
agree with (A). In particular, we therefore again have that there is
some σ ≺ Xe such that no Y ≻ σ agrees with (A). After some finite
stage, all markers placed by strategy e are placed on extensions of σ,
and so therefore, there are at most finitely many markers placed on
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initial segments of Y ’s that agree with (A). This again proves that
for every e, there are at most finitely many gaps of size 2−e in the set
enumerated by φ˜(A). 
This observation can be modified by a technique from a previous
paper of the second author (Lemma 2.6 from [7]) which says that “left
c.e.” can be replaced by any property that can by realized by a uni-
formly in 0′ effective basis theorem.
Observation 4.8. Let F be any function from reals to reals such that
for any Π01 tree T , if T is infinite, then F(T ) is an infinite path through
T that is uniformly computable in 0′ together with a Π01 index for T .
Assume there is no X in the range of F such that {n : X(n) = A(n)}
is density-1. Then A is density-1-bounding.
In particular, using the Low Basis Theorem, this says that if A is not
density-1-bounding, then A agrees with a low set on a set of density
1. Likewise, using the cone avoidance basis theorem, this says that if
A is not density-1-bounding, then for any noncomputable ∆02 B, there
is a ∆02 set X such that X T B and A agrees with X on a set of
density-1, etc. In essence, Observation 4.8 is an observation schema
across 0′ computable basis theorems.
Proof (sketch). In the proof of Proposition 4.3, wherever strategy e
would normally place a marker on the shortest unmarked node of Te,s,
have it instead place a marker on the shortest unmarked node of the
stage-s ∆02 approximation to F(Te). (A Π
0
1 index for Te can be ob-
tained using the recursion theorem.) Let Xe = F(Te). Because ∆
0
2
approximations eventually converge, for every σ ≺ Xe, we have that
eventually all markers are placed on extensions of σ, which is sufficient
for the verification for Proposition 4.3 and also for Observation 4.7. 
Remark. If the proof of Proposition 4.3 could be modified somehow
to make each Xe computable, then Observation 4.7 would probably be
able to be modified to say that if there is no computable setX such that
{n : X(n) = A(n)} is density-1 then A is density-1-bounding. Note
that Observation 4.1 implies that if A is coarsely computable, then A
is in the same generic degree as a density-1 set, and so in particular is
density-1-bounding. Combining these two would prove that if A is not
generically computable, then A is density-1-bounding, solving Question
1.
Simplifying the analysis above leads to a question that has been
open since the writing of [7], but that now appears to be sufficiently
motivated to be worth stating as an open problem.
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Question 2. Is there a uniform proof of Proposition 4.3?
This question asks whether there is a single φ such that for every A,
if A is not computable, then φA is an enumeration of a density-1 set
with no density-1 c.e. subset. A positive solution would not necessarily
answer Question 1 as well, because the solution might not admit the
modification required for Observation 4.7, but the question is elegant
and simple enough that it might merit study in its own right.
We conclude the section with a proof of a result that effectively says
that the observations stated here are not already sufficient to prove
that every nonzero degree is density-1-bounding in the generic degrees.
Proposition 4.9 (Dzhafarov, Igusa). There exists a real A such that
for every F as in Observation 4.8, there is an X in the range of F
such that {n : X(n) = A(n)} is density-1, but such that A is neither
coarsely computable nor generically computable.
Note that by Observation 4.8 and Lemma 4.1, if there existed a A
that was not density-1-bounding, then such a A would necessarily need
to be a witness to Proposition 4.9.
This construction is a slight modification of a construction by Dzha-
farov, Igusa, and Westrick [personal communication] in which they
proved Proposition 4.9 without the additional requirement that A not
be generically computable. The previous construction could only build
generically computable A although it contained most of the ideas nec-
essary to write this proof.
Proof. We build an infinite computable tree T ⊆ 2<ω such that given
any two paths in [T ], the two paths agree on density 1, and such that no
path in [T ] is is either coarsely computable or generically computable.
Any path in [T ], can then be used as our A. This is because, given any
F , there must be a path in [T ] that is in the range of F , and by con-
struction of T , that path must agree with A on density 1. Furthermore,
by construction of T , A is neither coarsely computable nor generically
computable.
The construction is as follows. We have requirements:
Ci: φi does not coarsely compute a path through T .
Gi: φi does not generically compute a path through T .
We first remark that if each individual requirement can be met uni-
formly, then we can combine those trees to produce T . More formally:
Claim. Assume there is a computable function f such that φf(2i) com-
putes an infinite tree T2i ⊆ 2
<ω all of whose paths agree on density 1
such that φi does not coarsely compute a path through T2i, and such
that φf(2i+1) computes an infinite tree T2i+1 ⊆ 2
<ω all of whose paths
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agree on density 1 such that φi does not generically compute a path
through T2i+1. Then there is an infinite computable tree T ⊆ 2
<ω all of
whose paths agree on density 1 such that no path is either generically
computable or coarsely computable.
Proof of Claim. Given X ∈ 2ω, let Xk = {n : (2n + 1)2
k ∈ X}.
Note that if X is generically computable, then each Xk is generically
computable, and if X is coarsely computable, then each Xk is coarsely
computable.
For each k, let Tk be as in the statement of the claim. Define T
by X ∈ [T ] iff for each k, Xk ∈ [Tk]. (Note that because the Tk are
uniformly computable, this is a Π01 class, and so in particular, there is
a T whose paths are the reals such that ∀kXk ∈ Tk.) We then claim
that if X ∈ [T ], then X is neither coarsely nor generically computable.
To see this, assume otherwise. Assume X ∈ [T ] and ψ is a Turing
functional that coarsely computesX (the proof for generic computation
will be nearly identical). Define g so that φg(i)(n) = ψ((2n + 1)2
2i).
Note then that if ψ is a coarse computation of X , then φg(i) is a coarse
computation of X2i. By the recursion theorem, there exists an i such
that φg(i) = φi, providing a contradiction, because Xi was specifically
constructed to not be coarsely computable via φi.
It remains to show that any two paths in [T ] must agree on density-1.
Let X, Y ∈ [T ], let ǫ > 0. Let l be such that 2−l < ǫ
2
. For each k < l,
let nk be such that for m > nk, Xk ↾ m and Yk ↾ m agree on m(1−
ǫ
2
)
many bits. Let n = maxk<l(nk2
k). It is straightforward to check that
for m > n, X ↾ m and Y ↾ m agree on m(1 − ǫ) many bits.
This concludes the proof of the claim. To complete the proof of the
theorem, it now remains to construct the Tk uniformly.
Meeting requirement Ci: We meet all of these requirements uniformly
with a single tree. Let X0 be any real that is generically computable
but not coarsely computable (exists by [9]).
Let φ be the Turing functional that generically computes X0. For
every i, let T2i be the tree of all X such that φ is a generic computation
of X . Note that all such X agree on density 1 (because they agree on
dom(φ)), and are not coarsely computable (because a coarse compu-
tation of one of them would be a coarse computation of every one of
them, and X0 is not coarsely computable).
Meeting requirement Gi: We construct a tree T2i+1 ⊆ 2
<ω all of whose
paths agree on density 1 such that φi does not generically compute a
path through T2i+1.
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We construct a computable tree T˜ ⊆ 2<ω such that any two paths in
[T˜ ] agree on density 1 but such that, for any n ∈ ω, there is at least one
X ∈ [T˜ ] with X(n) = 0 and at least one X ∈ [T˜ ] with X(n) = 1. If we
ever see φi(n) halt for any value of n, then we let ni be the first value
of n for which φi(n) ↓, and si > ni be the number of stages required to
see that φi(ni) ↓.
We then define:
T2i+1 = {σ ∈ T˜ : |σ| < si} ∪ {σ ∈ T˜ : |σ| ≥ si ∧ σ(ni) 6= φi(ni)}.
Note, in particular, that T2i+1 will be defined uniformly in i, and that
if φi never halts (or if φi(ni) /∈ {0, 1}) then T2i+1 = T˜ .
To ensure that all paths in [T˜ ] agree on density 1, we ensure that
every path in [T˜ ] is density-1 (as a subset of ω), and so any two paths
agree on a set containing their intersection, which is a density-1 set.
We put the empty string into T˜ .
When we define T˜ ↾ {σ : 2n ≤ |σ| < 2n+1} we will have that there
exist exactly 2n-many σ ∈ T˜ with |σ| = 2n−1, and we will ensure that
there exist exactly 2n+1-many σ ∈ T˜ with |σ| = 2n+1 − 1.
To define T˜ ↾ {σ : 2n ≤ |σ| < 2n+1}, each σ ∈ T˜ with |σ| = 2n − 1
selects one element mσ of [2
n, 2n+1), and extends itself so that the
extensions of σ of length 2n+1−1 are precisely the two τ of that length
such that τ ≻ σ and τ(m) = 1 if (m ∈ [2n, 2n+1) and m 6= mσ).
If each σ selects a different mσ, then every m ∈ [2
n, 2n+1) will be
selected, because |[2n, 2n+1)| = 2n. This is easy to arrange.
At the end of the construction, for each X ∈ T˜ , for each n ∈ ω,
there will be at most one m ∈ [2n, 2n+1) such that m /∈ X , and so X
will be density-1. Also, every σ in T˜ extends to an X ∈ [T˜ ], and so, in
particular, for every m, there is an X ∈ [T˜ ] such that X(m) = 0 and
an X ∈ [T˜ ] such that X(m) = 1. 
Given the results of this section, the paths through this tree T are
potential candidates for sets that are not density-1-bounding in the
generic degrees. However, we now show that all of the paths through
T are density-1-bounding.
Proposition 4.10. Let T be the tree constructed in Proposition 4.9.
Every X ∈ [T ] is density-1-bounding in the generic degrees.
Proof. Let T be the tree constructed in Proposition 4.9, and for each
k ∈ ω, let Tk be constructed as in the proof of Proposition 4.9.
Let X ∈ [T ]. Let Xk = {n : (2n + 1)2
k ∈ X}, and note that by
definition of T , we have that Xk ∈ [Tk].
DENSITY-1-BOUNDING AND QUASIMINIMALITY 21
Define Y so that Yi = X2i+1. More formally, so that (2n + 1)2
i ∈
Y ↔ n ∈ X2i+1. Note that Y is not generically computable by the same
argument as why X is neither generically nor coarsely computable.
Note also that Y is density-1, because for every i, every path through
T2i+1 is density-1. Finally, Y ≤g X , because a generic oracle for X
must contain density-1 many of the bits of Xk for every k. 
The reason we are able to prove Proposition 4.10 is that the non-
coarse computability requirements and non-generic computability re-
quirements are addressed independently in the proof of Proposition
4.9. If there were a way of meeting both sorts of requirements si-
multaneously, perhaps by meeting general “non-dense-computability”
requirements, then this might shed additional light on Question 1.
Question 3. If we define a real A to be “densely computable” if there
is a partial computable φ such that {n : φ(n) = A(n)} is density 1,
then does there exist an infinite computable tree T ⊆ 2<ω such that
given any two paths in [T ], the two paths agree on density 1, and such
that no path in [T ] is densely computable?
5. Randoms and Generics
In this section, we investigate the generic degrees of random reals,
and of generic reals. We show that both randomness and generic-
ity imply quasiminimality in the cofinite degrees, and therefore (by
Lemma 3.8) in the mod-finite, generic, and coarse degrees. In particu-
lar, this provides examples of quasiminimal sets that are not density-1,
potentially helping along the way to a construction of a set that is not
density-1-bounding. We also show that both randomness and generic-
ity imply density-1-bounding in the generic degrees, potentially helping
along the way to a proof that all non-generically-computable sets are
density-1-bounding.
Proposition 5.1. If A is a weakly 1-random real, then A is density-
1-bounding in the generic degrees.
Remark. Weak 1-randomness is implied by 1-randomness, and also by
weak 1-genericity and therefore 1-genericity. Therefore, in particular,
this shows that 1-randoms and 1-generics are density-1-bounding in the
generic degrees.
Proof. The proof we present is very similar to that of Theorem 2.2 of
Hirschfeldt, Jockusch, McNicholl, and Schupp [5].
Define B = {σ ∈ 2<ω : σ ⊀ A}. For purposes of density, it is
important to determine which coding of 2<ω as a subset of ω is being
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used. We use the standard order on 2<ω: first by length of σ, and
then lexicographically among σ of the same length, with one small
adjustment. We start with the empty string being coded by n = 1, not
n = 0, so that {σ : |σ| = i} will be coded in to Pi, as in Definition 4.4.
(There is no string coded by n = 0.)
Note that for any A at all, B as defined above is density-1, because
there is exactly one σ of each length not in B. Likewise, for any A at
all, A ≥g B, as follows.
If (A) is any partial oracle for A, consider the partial computation of
B given by enumerating all σ that (A) is able to rule out as potential
initial segments of A:
φ(A)(σ) = 1↔ ∃n
(
n ∈ dom((A)) & n < |σ| & (A)(n) 6= σ(n)
)
.
Note that for any partial oracle (A), for A, φ(A) is a partial computation
of B.
If dom((A)) is infinite, then we claim that φ(A) is a generic compu-
tation of B. To show this, we show that for each e, there are at most
finitely many i such that dom(φ(A)) has a gap of size 2−e at Pi, and
then appeal to Lemma 4.5. To see this, let e be given, and fix i0 such
that |dom((A)) ↾ i0| ≥ e + 1. For i > i0, there are at most 2
i−(e+1)
many σ of length i agreeing with (A), and so φ(A) enumerates at least
2i− 2i−(e+1) many σ of length i, and so dom(φ(A)) does not have a gap
of size 2−e at Pi.
It now remains to show that if A is weakly 1-random, then the B
that we built is not generically computable.
Because B is density-1, it is generically computable if and only if
it has a density-1 c.e. subset. To prove that this cannot be the case,
let We be a c.e. set, thought of as coding a subset of 2
<ω. Consider
V = {X ∈ 2ω : ∀σ ∈ We, σ ⊀ X}. This is a Π01 class, and we claim
that if We is density-1, then V is null, and we also claim that if We is
a subset of B, then A is an element of V.
Both of these claims are straightforward from the definitions, and
we leave the verification to the reader. If A is weakly 1-random, then
A cannot be a member of any null Π01 class, and so We cannot be a
generic computation of B. 
We now go on to prove that 1-generics and 1-randoms are quasimini-
mal in the cofinite, (and hence mod-finite, generic and coarse) degrees.
Both of these proofs will be by the following lemma, which summa-
rizes and compiles the results of Sections 2 and 3 that we will use in this
section. Note that the results of Section 2 concerning time-independent
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functionals apply equally well to cofinite reduction as they do to generic
reduction.
Lemma 5.2. Assume A is not quasiminimal in the cofinite degrees.
Then there exists a time-independent Turing functional φ such that for
any cofinite oracle (A), for A, φ(A) is total, and furthermore such that
φA is not multivalued, and is a computation of a noncomputable real
B.
Proof. If A is not quasiminimal in the cofinite degrees, then by defini-
tion of quasiminimality, these is a noncomputable B such thatR(B) ≤cf
A. By Observation 2.8, there is a time-independent Turing functional
ψ such that R(B) ≤cf A via φ. Any cofinite oracle for R(B) can be
uniformly used to compute B, and if we use the time-independent ver-
sion of the Turing functional that computes B from a cofinite oracle
for R(B), and compose that functional with ψ, then we obtain a time-
independent Turing functional ψ such that for any cofinite oracle (A),
for A, φ(A) is a total computation of B.
In particular, because cofinite computations are never allowed to
make mistakes, φA only produces correct outputs concerning B, and so
is not multivalued. 
Proposition 5.3. If A is weakly 1-generic, then A is quasi-minimal
in the cofinite degrees, and hence in the mod-finite, generic, and coarse
degrees.
Proof. Let A be weakly 1-generic, and assume A is not quasiminimal.
By Lemma 5.2, there is a noncomputable B and a time-independent
Turing functional φ such that for any cofinite oracle (A), for A, φ(A) is
total, and is a computation of B. We prove then that B is computable
as follows.
Consider S = {σ ∈ 2<ω : φσ is multivalued}. Note that S is Σ01
because σ ∈ S ↔ ∃n (φσ(n) ↓= 1 & φσ(n) ↓= 0). If S is dense, then
because A is weakly 1-generic, A meets S, and so by Observation 2.7
it cannot be the case that φA is a computation of B.
If S is not dense, then choose any τ that has no extensions in S.
Let m = |τ |. For any X ∈ 2ω, let Xm be the partial oracle for X
that does not halt on any of its first m bits. Then we claim that B is
computable by the functional ψ such that ψ(n) searches for an X such
that φXm(n) ↓ and then outputs the same value as the found output.
This computation is total because for any cofinite oracle (A), for A,
φ(A) is total, and so in particular, for any n, φ(A)m(n) ↓. Furthermore,
when this computation halts, it gives a correct output for the following
reason. Assume not, and fix X such that φXm(n) ↓6= B(n). Let k
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be the use of this computation (the smallest number such that only
X ↾ k was required for the computation of φXm(n)). Note then that
by hypothesis φAk(n) ↓= B(n). Let l be the use of this computation.
Let σ ∈ 2<ω be given by σ ↾ m = τ , σ ↾ [m, k) = X ↾ [m, k), and
σ ↾ [k, l) = A ↾ [k, l). Note then that σ  τ , and furthermore, because
φ is a time-independent functional, φσ(n) = φXm(n) 6= B, and also
φσ(n) = φAk(n) = B, so φσ is multivalued, contradicting our choice of
τ . 
Proposition 5.4. If A is 1-random, then A is quasi-minimal in the
cofinite degrees, and hence in the mod-finite, generic, and coarse de-
grees.
The proof of Proposition 5.4 is somewhat more involved than the
proof of Proposition 5.3. It will use Lemma 5.2 as well as a fairly
subtle control of the halting measure of φ. Throughout the remainder
of the section, we will always assume that φ is a time-independent
Turing functional.
Definition 5.5. Fix φ, and an integer n. Let k ≤ l be integers.
For any real X, let Xk be the partial oracle for X that does not halt
on inputs less than k, and let Xk,l be the partial oracle for X that does
not halt on inputs less than k or greater than or equal to l.
Define µk = µ({X : φ
Xk(n) ↓}), the halting measure of φ-computations
that do not use the first k bits of their oracles.
Similarly, define µk,l = µ({X : φ
Xk,l(n) ↓}).
Note that φ and n are suppressed in the notation for brevity.
Observation 5.6.
If k0 < k1, then for any l, µk0,l ≥ µk1,l, and also µk0 ≥ µk1.
If l0 < l1, then for any k, µk,l0 ≤ µk,l1.
For any k, µk = liml→∞ µk,l.
Proof. The first two facts follow from Observation 2.6, which says that
larger oracles never have smaller halting sets. The third fact is because
any computation that halts does so using only finitely much from its
oracle. 
Lemma 5.7. Let A be 1-random, φ a time-independent Turing func-
tional, and n an integer. If for every cofinite oracle (A) for A, φ(A)(n) ↓,
then, for that φ and n, for every k, µk = 1.
Proof. Assume not. Fix k such that µk 6= 1, and fix some computable
ǫ > 0 such that µk < 1− ǫ.
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Consider the open sets Ui defined by X ∈ Ui if φ
Xk converges for
at least i different independent reasons. We make this precise by an
inductive definition as follows.
Let U0 = 2
ω, and for every X , kX,0 = k.
Having defined Ui, and kX,i for every X in Ui, we let Ui+1 = {X ∈
Ui : φ
XkX,i ↓}, and for every X in Ui+1, we let kX,i+1 be the minimum
number s such that φXkX,i ↓ in less than s steps, and using less than
the first s bits of the oracle X . Such an s can be found computably in
X for any X in Ui+1, and so each Ui is defined Σ1 in the previous one.
Thus, the Ui are uniformly Σ1 sets.
Furthermore, µ(Ui) ≤ (1− ǫ)
i. This is because to determine whether
or not X ∈ Ui, we must see that φ
Xk halts (a measure < 1 − ǫ event),
then we ignore everything that caused φXk to halt, and require that
φXkX,0 halts (another measure < 1− ǫ event) and so on. Each event is
independent, and so the probability of meeting all of them is equal to
their product.
If for every l, φAl ↓, then A must be in every Ui. This contradicts
the assumption that A is 1-random. 
This lemma will be what we require in order to construct a col-
lection of “towers” that will prove our contradiction. We will use
the ideas of a “90%-halting tower,” an “80%-agreement tower,” and
a “60%-disagreement tower.” The numbers 90%, 80%, and 60% are
not special: the only important facts about them are that 100% >
90% > 80% > 50%, and also that 80% > 60% > 0%. For our proof, it
will be convenient that 0.6 < 0.82.
Definition 5.8. Fix φ and n, and k. Then for that φ, n and k, a
90%-halting tower starting at k is a sequence of numbers 〈ki : i ∈ ω〉
such that k0 = k, for every i, ki+1 > ki, and µki,µki+1 > 0.9.
Observation 5.9. Fix φ, n.
If there exists some k such that there is a 90%-halting tower start-
ing at k, then for every k, there is a 90%-halting tower starting at k.
Moreover, that 90% halting tower can be found uniformly computably
in n, k.
Proof. The obvious greedy algorithm works for this. Let k0 = k, and
search for a k1 such that µk0,µk1 > 0.9. Eventually such a k1 will
be found because there is a 90%-halting tower, 〈li : i ∈ ω〉 starting
somewhere, and that other halting tower must have some i such that
li ≥ k0. But then µk0,li+1 ≥ µli,li+1 ≥ 0.9 (using Observation 5.6). Thus,
li+1 would work as k1, although some other smaller or larger k might
be found first. We then proceed inductively to define each ki. 
26 PETER CHOLAK, GREGORY IGUSA
Lemma 5.10. Assume that φ is such that for every n, and for every
k, µk = 1. Then, for that φ and for every n and k, there exists a
90%-halting tower starting at k.
Proof. Once again, the obvious greedy algorithm works. We let k0 = k,
and for each i, let ki+1 be the first l found such that µki,l ≥ 0.9. Such
an l exists because liml→∞ µki = 1. 
Definition 5.11. Fix φ, n, k, and 〈ki : i ∈ ω〉, a 90%-halting tower
starting at k. Then 〈ki : i ∈ ω〉 is an 80%-agreement tower if there
exists some v ∈ {0, 1} such that:
(1) There exists an i such that µ{X : φXki,ki+1 (n) = v} > 0.8 and,
(2) There does not exist an i such that µ{X : φXki,ki+1 (n) 6= v} >
0.8.
In this case, we will sometimes say that 〈ki : i ∈ ω〉 is an 80%-
agreement tower with value v.
The purpose of these 80% agreement towers is that they will allow us
to compute B without needing A as an oracle. We will later prove that
they must exist, but first we show how they can be used to compute
B.
Lemma 5.12. Assume that A is 1-random, and that φA is a com-
putation of B. Fix n, k, v. Assume that for that φ, n, there exists a
computable 80%-agreement tower, 〈ki : i ∈ ω〉, with value v starting at
k. Then B(n) = v.
Proof. Assume the hypotheses are true and the conclusion is false.
Consider the open sets Ui = {X : φ
Xki,ki+1 (n) = v}. We have that
A is not in any Ui because φ
A(n) = B(n) 6= v. Also, for every i,
µ{X : φXki,ki+1 (n) ↓} > 0.9, and there does not exist an i such that
µ{X : φXki,ki+1 (n) 6= v} > 0.8. Therefore µ(Ui > 10%).
Let Ci be the complement of Ui, and let C =
⋂
iCi. The measure of
the intersection of the Ci is equal to the product of the measures of the
Ci because each Ci is defined in terms of only the bits of X between ki
and ki+1. Therefore C is a null Π
0
1 set, and A ∈ C. This contradicts
the assumption that A is 1-random. 
To prove that they must exist, we will use 60%-disagreement towers,
which will derandomize X if φ does not produce enough 80% agreement
towers. These 60%-disagreement towers, unlike most of our other work
in this proof, will not be fixed to a specific n.
Definition 5.13. Let φ be given. Then a 60%-disagreement tower for
φ is a sequence 〈mi : i ∈ ω〉 such that for every i,
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µ
{
X : (∃n)
(
φXmi,mi+1 is a multivalued function on n
)}
> 0.6.
Observation 5.14. If there is a 60%-disagreement tower for φ, then
there is a computable 60%-disagreement tower for φ.
Proof. Again, a greedy algorithm produces a a computable 60%-disagreement
tower. 
Lemma 5.15. Let φ be be given. Then, either there exists a k such that
every 90%-halting tower (for any n) starting at k is an 80%-agreement
tower, or there exists a 60%-disagreement tower for φ.
Proof. Assume the first clause is false. We construct a 60%-disagreement
tower as follows.
Let m0 = 0. Choose some n and some 〈ki : i ∈ ω〉 that is a
90%-halting tower for that n starting at k = m0 that is not an 80%-
agreement tower.
Case 1: If it is not an 80%-agreement because it never reaches a
consensus (ie, it fails the first clause in the definition of 80%-agreement
towers), then choose j to be large enough that (0.9)(1 − (0.9)j−1) >
(0.6), and let m1 = kj . We claim then that
µ
{
X :
(
φXm0,m1 is a multivalued function on n
)}
> 0.6.
This is because of the following calculation.
Let S be the set of X such that φXk0,k1 (n) halts. Note that µ(S) ≥
0.9, by definition of a 90% halting tower.
We show that given any i > 0, and any σ with |σ| = ki, if σ ≺ X for
some X ∈ S, and φσ(n) is not multivalued, then φτ (n) is multivalued
for at least 10% of all τ ≻ σ with |τ | = ki+1. This will show that, φ
τ (n)
is multivalued for at least measure (0.9)(1− (0.9)j−1) many τ of length
kj because each time we increase i, 10% of all strings that have not yet
become multivalued become multivalued, and we started with measure
0.9 many strings.
Let σ be as above, and note that because σ ≺ X for some X ∈ S, we
have that φσ(n) is defined. By hypothesis of Case 1, at least 10% many
X give the opposite output from the rest of the X when computing
φXi,i+1. In particular, this implies that at least 10% many X halt and
give the opposite output from φσ(n) when computing φXi,i+1. This
computation does not use any bits of X less than |σ|, or greater than
ki+1, and so 10% many of all τ ≻ σ with |τ | = ki+1 cause φ
τ (n) to
halt and give the opposite output from φσ(n). But because τ ≻ σ,
φτ(n) also halts and gives the same output as φσ(n), and so φτ (n) is
multivalued.
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Case 2: If the 90%-halting tower is not an 80%-agreement tower be-
cause it does reach a consensus, but it also reaches the opposite con-
sensus at some point, then let j be large enough that both kinds of
consensus get reached before kj , and let m1 = kj. Then at least 80%
of the oracles from the first consensus arrive at the opposite conclusion
with their later information, and so, in particular, they give a multival-
ued function if enough of the oracle is taken to witness both of those
computations. We have that 0.82 = 0.64 > 0.6, and so at that stage,
at least measure 0.6-many oracles produce multivalued functions.
We then repeat the construction, choosing a potentially new n, and
a new 90%-halting tower beginning at k = m1 to find m2, and then we
repeat with m2, m3 etc. At each stage, this ensures that for 60% of all
X , φXmi,mi+1 (n) is multivalued for some value of n. 
Lemma 5.16. Assume that A is 1-random, and that there is some B
such that for every k, φAk is a computation of B. Then there is no
60%-disagreement tower for φ.
Proof. If it is true that for every k, φAk is a computation of B, then in
particular, there is no partial oracle for A that causes φ to be a multi-
valued function. Thus, in particular, there can be nomi, mi+1 such that
Ami,mi+1 is in the “60% disagreement part” of the 60%-disagreement
tower.
Thus, if there existed a 60%-disagreement tower for φ, then A would
be in the intersection, over all i, of the reals X such that φXmi,mi+1 is
not a multivalued function on n. This is an intersection of uniformly
Π01 sets, and so it is a Π
0
1 set. Furthermore, it is a measure 0 set because
each one of the sets was at most measure 0.4, and the sets each use
disjoint parts of the oracle, so the measure of their intersection is the
product of their measures. A 1-random real A cannot be in a Π01 null
set, and so there cannot be a 60%-disagreement tower for φ. 
We are now ready to prove Proposition 5.4, which we restate here
for clarity.
Proposition 5.4. If A is 1-random, then R˜(A) (and hence A) is
quasi-minimal in the generic degrees.
Proof. Assume A is 1-random. We show that A is quasi-minimal in the
cofinite degrees, and hence that R˜(A) is quasi-minimal in the generic
degrees. To prove this, assume that for every cofinite oracle (A) for
A, φ(A) is a computation of B. We must prove that B is therefore
computable.
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By Lemma 5.7, for that φ and for every n, and every k, we must
have that µk = 1. By Lemma 5.10, we therefore have that for every
n and k, there is a 90%-halting tower starting at k. By Lemmas 5.15
and 5.16, we have that there exists an l such that every 90%-halting
tower (for any n) starting at l is an 80%-agreement tower.
Fix such an l. We now compute B through a “majority vote” trick.
To compute B(n), wait until 80% of all X have the property that
φXl(n) ↓, giving the same output, then halt and give that output. We
must now verify that this will happen at some point, and that when it
happens, it gives the correct output.
We know this will eventually happen, because there is a 90%-halting
tower starting at l, and it is an 80% agreement tower. Thus there
exist some v, ki, ki+1 such that l ≤ ki ≤ ki+1, and µ{X : φ
Xki,ki+1 (n) =
v} > 0.8. However, for any X , if φXki,ki+1 (n) = v, then φXl(n) = v,
because Xl is is a partial oracle extension of Xki,ki+1, and so we have
that µ{X : φXl(n) = v} > 0.8.
Furthermore, the v that we find must be the value v of some 80%
agreement tower. This is because we may build a 90% halting tower for
which k0 = l, and k1 is large enough to witness that measure 80% many
X give output v. By assumption, this tower is an 80% agreement tower,
and by definition of 80% agreement tower, no “floor” of the tower can
have 80% many X give an output other than the value v of that tower,
and so the v that we found is the v of that tower.
Therefore, by Lemma 5.12, that v must be B(n), and so we have
correctly computed B(n) without using A as an oracle. 
6. Nonuniform generic reducibility
In this section, we consider nonuniform generic reducibility, which
has the property that the functional φ is allowed to change depending
on the generic oracle for A. This section is joint work with Denis
Hirschfeldt.
Definition 6.1. Let A and B be reals. Then B is non-uniformly
generically reducible to A if for every generic oracle, (A), for A, there
exists a Turing functional φ such that φ(A) is a generic computation of
B. In this case, we write B ≤ng A.
Note that the Turing degrees embed into the nonuniform generic
degrees by the same map as the one used to embed them into the
uniform generic degrees, and so we may again define a degree to be
quasiminimal if it is not above any nonzero embedded Turing degrees.
We show weakly 2-randoms are quasiminimal in the nonuniform generic
30 PETER CHOLAK, GREGORY IGUSA
degrees, and also that 1-generics are quasiminimal in the nonuniform
generic degrees. The inspiration for this section comes from a preprint
of [4], and the realization that much of their work was complementary
to the work in this paper.
In a preprint of [4], Hirschfeldt, Jockusch, Kuyper and Schupp proved
that ∆02 1-randoms are not quasiminimal in the nonuniform coarse de-
grees (Corollary 3.11 from [4]), but that weakly 2-randoms are quasi-
minimal in the nonuniform coarse degrees (Corollary 3.3 from [4]).
They also asked whether 1-randoms are quasiminimal in the uniform
coarse degrees.
Proposition 5.4 answers this, showing that 1-randoms are quasimin-
imal in both the uniform coarse and uniform generic degrees. In the
published version of [4], the authors also modify their proof of Corollary
3.11 to show that ∆02 1-randoms are not quasiminimal in the nonuni-
form generic degrees. In this section, we combine our proof of Propo-
sition 5.4 with the proof of Corollary 3.3 from [4] to prove that weakly
2-randoms are quasiminimal in the nonuniform generic degrees.
We use the following result, implicitly proved in the proof of Theorem
3.2 of [4], but stated here in the form that we will use.
Lemma 6.2 (Hirschfeldt, Jockusch, Kuyper, Schupp [4]). Assume A
is weakly 2-random, B is noncomputable, and k > 1. For each i < k,
let A=i = {n : kn + i ∈ A}, and let A6=i =
⊕
j 6=iA=j.
Then (∃i < k)(B T A6=i).
Furthermore, for every i, A=i is 1-random relative to A6=i.
Proof (sketch). Assume that for every i, B ≤T A6=i. By a generalized
form of Van Lambalgen’s Theorem [11], we have that for every i, A=i is
1-random relative to A6=i, and so therefore relative to B⊕A6=i ≡T A6=i.
By the same generalized form of Van Lambalgen’s Theorem relativized
to B, we therefore have that A is 1-random relative to B. We also have
that B ≤T A (because B ≤T A6=i), and so we can conclude that B is a
base for 1-randomness, and hence is K-trivial [6].
A weakly 2-random cannot compute any noncomputable ∆02 sets [2],
and so cannot compute any noncomputable K-trivials. 
Theorem 6.3 (Cholak, Hirschfeldt, Igusa). Assume A is weakly 2-
random. Then A is quasiminimal in the nonuniform generic degrees.
The proof will use a relativized version of Proposition 5.4. The
proof of Proposition 5.4 made ample use of uniformity, so we begin
our argument with a forcing argument that will allow us to reduce the
question to a uniform question. The uniform question will then be
answered using Lemma 6.2 and Proposition 5.4.
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Note also that in in Section 2 we were working with uniform generic
reducibility, and so we do not have access to Observation 2.8, which
said that we may use time-independent functionals, and hence ignore
the time dependence in our partial oracles. Because of this we will
work directly with time-dependent partial oracles. In subsequent work
Astor, Hirshfeldt, and Jockusch generalize the proof of Theorem 6.3 to
prove a full analogue of Observation 2.8, which would simplify many
of the steps of our proof.
We remind the reader that a partial oracle is coded as a set of ordered
triples 〈n, x, l〉, with n as the input, x as the output, and l as the
number of steps required for the oracle to halt. As such, we will use
the following nonuniform version of Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 6.4. Assume A is not quasiminimal in the nonuniform generic
degrees degrees. Then there exists a noncomputable real B such that for
any generic oracle (A), for A, B ≤T (A).
Proof (Lemma 6.4). By definition of quasiminimality, if A is not quasi-
minimal, then there is a noncomputable B such that R˜(R(B)) ≤ng A.
So R˜(R(B)) is generically computable from every generic oracle for
A. But every generic oracle for R˜(R(B)) can compute B, and so B is
computable from every generic oracle for A. 
Proof (Theorem 6.3). First, we construct a forcing poset that will al-
low us to define a generic generic oracle, G for A. The poset P will
consist of finite approximations to partial oracles for A, together with
a restriction saying that in the future, the partial oracles will need to
have domain at least a certain size. In order to ensure that generic
generic oracles are not total, p will determine the entire behavior of
G ↾ m for some m, so in particular, extensions of p will not be allowed
to halt at locations smaller than m.
A finite partial oracle σ for A is given by a number m = |σ| and a
subset of m×2×ω which, thought of as a subset of ω×2×ω would be
a partial oracle for A. For n < m, σ ↾ n is a shorthand for the partial
oracle τ such that |τ | = n and for k < n, 〈k, x, l〉 ∈ τ ↔ 〈k, x, l〉 ∈ σ.
As with other partial oracles, dom(σ) = {n < |σ| : ∃x∃l〈n, x, l〉 ∈ σ}.
We define the poset P to be the set of ordered pairs 〈σ, ǫ〉 such that
σ is a partial oracle for A, ǫ > 0, and dom(σ)
|σ|
> 1− ǫ. Given conditions
p = 〈σ, ǫ〉, and q = 〈τ, δ〉, we say that q ≤ p if |τ | ≥ |σ|, τ ↾ |σ| = σ
δ ≤ ǫ, and for all n, if |σ| ≤ n ≤ |τ |, then dom(τ↾n)
n
> 1− ǫ.
A generic generic oracle G for A is given by taking a sufficiently
generic filter G˜ for P and letting G =
⋃
〈σ,ǫ〉∈G˜ σ. Note that it is dense
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to decrease ǫ below any positive number, and so a generic generic oracle
for A is a generic oracle for A.
In this proof, we only use genericity of G˜ for two purposes: ensuring
that G is a generic oracle, and ensuring that, given an arbitrary φ, if
φG is a computation of B, then there is a condition p ∈ G˜ that forces
that φG is a computation of B. We do not wish to explicitly count
quantifiers, but P is A-computable, so some small level of genericity
relative to A⊕ B is sufficient.
So, let A be weakly 2-random, and assume that A is not quasimin-
imal. By Lemma 6.4, fix B noncomputable such that B ≤T (A) for
every generic oracle (A) for A. Let G be a generic generic oracle for A,
and fix φ such that φG is a computation of B. Fix a condition p = 〈σ, ǫ〉
that forces that φG is a computation of B. Fix k such that 1
k
< ǫ. By
Lemma 6.2, fix i < k such that B T A6=i.
We then claim that relativized to A6=i, B is uniformly computable
from an arbitrary cofinite oracle for A=i, and also that, relative to A6=i,
A=i is 1-random, contradicting Proposition 5.4 relativized to A6=i.
Proof of Claim: Let X be an arbitrary cofinite oracle for A=i. Let
F(X) be the cofinite oracle for A defined as follows.
For m ≥ |σ|, let Sm = {n : (n ∈ dom(σ)) ∨ (|σ| ≤ n < m) ∨
(n ≥ m & n 6≡ i mod k)}. Choose m0 sufficiently large that for all
m ≥ dom(σ),
|Sm0 ↾m|
m
> 1− ǫ. (Such an m0 exists because k was chosen
so that 1
k
< ǫ.)
Let F(X) be the cofinite oracle for A that agrees with σ on |σ|, that
halts immediately on all m between |σ| and m0, that halts immediately
on all m ≥ m0 if m 6≡ i mod k, and so that if m > m0 and m ≡ i
mod k, then F(X)(m) = X(m−i
k
) (halting if and only if X halts, giving
the same output if it does halt, and halting with the same l value).
Finally, we define ψ so that ψX⊕A 6=i(n) searches for a partial oracle
Y such that:
• Y ↾ |σ| = σ
• dom(Y ) ⊆ dom(F(X))
• for each m ∈ dom(Y ), Y (m) = F(X)(m)
• φY (n) ↓
and when it finds such a Y , then ψX⊕A 6=i(n) ↓= φY (n).
(In essence, ψX⊕A 6=i is almost a time-independent version of φF(X),
except that it restricts its attention only to Y ’s that look potentially
like extensions of p.)
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It remains to show that ψX⊕A 6=i is total, and that it is correct aboutB
wherever it halts. (Note that showing that ψX⊕A 6=i is correct whenever
it halts will also show that it is not multivalued.)
To show that if ψX⊕A 6=i(n) ↓ then ψX⊕A 6=i(n) = B(n), let Y be as
above. Define q = 〈τ, ǫ〉 where τ is defined as the finite partial oracle
for A that agrees with σ on |σ|, that agrees with the portion of Y that
is queried in the computation of φY (n), and that “halts late” at all
locations larger than |σ| if Y was queried at that location, but Y was
not seen to halt at that location.
Here, “halting late” means that τ halts at those locations, but with
an l value larger than any l value queried in the computation of φY (n).
This ensures that τ agrees with the portion of Y that was queried
while also having a large enough domain to not violate the ǫ condition
imposed by p.
Then q  φG(n) = φY (n), because q agrees with the portion of Y
used in the computation. But also that q ≤ p, and so q  φG(n) =
B(n). Therefore φY (n) = B(n). This proof was shown for an arbitrary
Y as above, and so we have that if ψX⊕A 6=i(n) ↓ then ψX⊕A 6=i(n) =
B(n).
To show that if ψX⊕A 6=i is total, we show that there is a generic
generic oracle G0 for A, extending p, whose domain is contained in
dom(F(X)), and so, for every n, G0 will be found as one of the Y as
above. From this, because p  φG is total, we will have that for every
n, φG0(n) ↓, and so ψX⊕A 6=i(n) ↓.
To show that there exists such a G0, let m1 be the largest number
such thatm1 /∈ dom(F(X)). Let τ be defined as the finite partial oracle
F(X) ↾ m1 + 1, and let q = 〈τ, ǫ〉. By construction of F , we have that
q ≤ p. Let G0 be any generic generic oracle for A extending q. Then
G0 extends p, and its domain is contained in dom(F(X)) because its
domain restricted to m1 + 1 is equal to the domain of F(X) restricted
to m1 + 1, and F(X) is a total oracle past m1 + 1. 
Remark. Combining Proposition 5.4, and Theorem 6.3, with Corollar-
ies 3.3, 3.11, and 3.14 from [4], provides the following characterization
of the level of randomness required for to ensure quasiminimality in the
uniform or nonuniform cofinite, mod-finite, coarse, or generic degrees:
Theorem 6.5. In the uniform coarse and generic degrees, and also in
the cofinite, and mod-finite degrees, every 1-random is quasiminimal.
In the nonuniform coarse or generic degrees, every weakly 2-random
is quasiminimal, but there exist 1-randoms (any 1-random that is also
∆02) which are not quasiminimal.
34 PETER CHOLAK, GREGORY IGUSA
In light of this, one might ask whether this provides a character-
ization of the weakly 2-randoms, but it does not for a fairly trivial
reason:
Observation 6.6. There exists a 1-random A that is not weakly 2-
random that is quasiminimal in both the nonuniform coarse and generic
degrees.
Proof (sketch). Let B be 1-random but not weakly 2-random, and let
C be weakly 2-random relative to B. Let A be the asymmetric join of
B and C defined by A = {2n : n ∈ B} ∪
(
C \ {2n : n ∈ ω}
)
.
Note then that A is 1-random but not weakly 2-random, but that A
is coarsely (and generically) equivalent to C, and so quasiminimal in
the nonuniform coarse (and generic) degrees. 
We observe now that our proof of Theorem 6.3 allows us to also prove
that 1-generics are quasiminimal in the nonuniform generic degrees.
The following analogue of Lemma 6.2 is proved implicitly in the proof
of Theorem 4.2 of [4].
Lemma 6.7 (Hirschfeldt, Jockusch, Kuyper, Schupp [4]). Assume A
is 1-generic, B is noncomputable, and k > 1. For each i < k, let
A=i = {n : kn+ i ∈ A}, and let A6=i =
⊕
j 6=iA=j.
Then (∃i < k)(B T A6=i).
Furthermore, for every i, A=i is 1-generic relative to A6=i.
Proof (sketch). A theorem of Yu [12] replaces the generalized form of
Van Lambalgen’s Theorem that is used in the proof of Lemma 6.2,
and K-triviality is not needed because if A is 1-generic relative to a
noncomputable B, then B T A. 
Proposition 6.8 (Cholak, Hirschfeldt, Igusa). Assume A is 1-generic.
Then A is quasiminimal in the nonuniform generic degrees.
Proof (sketch). The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 6.3, using
Lemma 6.7 in place of Lemma 6.2, and using Proposition 5.3 in place
of Proposition 5.4 
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